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MATRIMONIAL REGIMES
Robert A. Pascal*
HUSBAND'S ANTENUPTUAL OBLIGATIONS- STRUCTURE OF COMMUNITY OF
GAINS
Creech v. Capital Mack, Inc.,' is a superb decision in the best
tradition of the Civil Law. It must be read and studied not only for
its result-a judicial rectification of past serious errors in the con-
struction of the law-but also for the example it provides of the
clarification and comprehension which can result from a study of the
law's background sources. The opinion should stand as a monument
to its author and to his colleagues who, in concurring with him, dem-
onstrated their intellectual honesty and the courage to reverse their
previously firmly announced convictions.
The question in Creech was a simple one: may an antenuptual
creditor of the husband enforce his right against an asset forming part
of the community of gains? Five years before in United States Fidel-
ity & Guaranty Co. v. Green,' the Louisiana supreme court had an-
swered the question in the negative. Creech answered it in the affirm-
ative.
The decision in Green had been based on two simple arguments.
Civil Code article 2403 appears to say unequivocally that the ante-
nuptual debts of each spouse are to be paid out of the separate assets
of the debtor spouse;3 and, inasmuch as judicial decisions since 1926,
have affirmed the wife's half ownership of the community assets at
all moments of its existence, to permit the husband's antenuptual
[and therefore separate] creditor to enforce his right out of the com-
munity assets would be to permit the use of the wife's assets to satisfy
her husband's obligation. The opinion in Creech skillfully resorts to
Spanish law sources to demonstrate that whereas the wife does have
a protectible interest in the community of gains under the Spanish
type regime in force in Louisiana, the totality of the assets falling into
the community of gains (and all the community debts as well) form
part of the husband's patrimony until its dissolution, entitling his
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 287 So. 2d 497 (La. 1973).
2. 252 La. 227, 210 So. 2d 328 (1968).
3. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2403: "In the same manner, the debts contracted during the
marriage enter into the partnership or community of gains, and must be acquitted out
of the common fund, whilst the debts of both husband and wife, anterior to the
marriage must be acquitted out of their own personal and individual effects."
4. The principal decisions are Phillips v. Phillips, 160 La. 813, 107 So. 584 (1926)
and Fazzio v. Krieger, 226 La. 511, 76 So. 2d 713 (1954).
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creditors, antenuptual as well as postnuptual, to reach them in satis-
faction of their rights (and enabling the wife to renounce one-half the
community debts at dissolution if she will renounce her right to de-
mand one-half the community assets). Having established this ele-
mentary point of the Spanish system, Justice Barham proceeds to
show both that the words of Civil Code article 2403 were taken from
a passage in Febrero's notarial manual5 in which that writer was
speaking of the payment of debts after dissolution of the regime, not
during its existence, and that to construe article 2403 literally, rather
than in the light of the structure of the community of gains as evi-
denced by all articles on the subject and their Spanish sources, would
result in an internally inconsistent set of rules on the subject. Finally,
having achieved this understanding, the opinion overrules Green and
also Phillips v. Phillips' and Fazzio v. Krieger7 insofar as they declare
the wife to own community assets in indivision with the husband
before dissolution of the regime.'
An unfortunate expression in the Creech opinion is that describ-
ing the wife's interest in the community assets before dissolution of
the regime as one of "imperfect ownership." Yet those who will have
the good will to seek Justice Barham's meaning rather than snipe at
a slip will not have difficulty. The opinion is clear enough. The wife
has an interest in being able to accept or renounce the community of
gains at its dissolution and the law provides what devices it can to
protect her in this right without depriving the husband of the freedom
he should have to employ and invest the community assets for their
common good.
The opinions in Green and Creech are living proof of the necess-
ity of understanding our institutions well if misconstructions and
misapplications are not to result. This is an instance in which legisla-
tive positivism and its general foreclosure against resort to historical
sources of the law-the cultural framework of the legal rules-would
have compelled the continued application of the Green misconstruc-
tion. As long as our supreme court demonstrates the application and
skill evident in Creech, the attorneys of the state will need to study
5. FEBRERO, LIBRERIA DE EscwHANos (1789).
6. 160 La. 813, 107 So. 584 (1926).
7. 226 La. 511, 76 So. 2d 713 (1954).
8. The overruling of Green, Phillips, and Fazzio deprives United States v.
Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190 (1971), of its false foundation. There the United States Supreme
Court declared a wife liable personally for income tax due on half the community
income, arguing that the United States tax laws impose liability for the tax on the
owner of the income. If the wife is not owner, as Creech declares, she should not be
liable personally for the tax.
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our civil law more deeply and with that they will come to appreciate
it more.
SUIT TO RECOVER Loss OF EARNINGS BY WIFE
Article 686 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended in 1970
declares the wife "is the proper party plaintiff" to sue for her earnings
and similar income even though such income is a community asset.
The writer construes this amended article to mean that the wife alone
may sue for her earnings and similar revenues. Does this construction
mean, however, that the wife alone may sue to recover for her loss of
earnings attributable to her injury caused by another's delict? Titard
v. Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co. ' 0 allowed a husband to recover
for this kind of loss by the wife without discussing article 686 as
amended, even though the suit had been filed after the effective date
of the amendment. May a distinction be made between a suit to
recover earnings and one to recover for a loss of earnings? The writer
thinks not. The purpose of the amendment to article 686 must have
been consistent with the present tendency to give the wife more con-
trol over her earnings and it is submitted that a recovery for loss of
earnings should be considered in the same category.
HUSBAND'S RIGHT TO ADMINISTER WIFE'S PARAPHERNALIA
American Indemnity Co. v. Leon Godchaux Clothing Co."
reached the conclusion that a husband, living with his wife under the
community of gains, could act in his own name to insure the para-
phernalia of his wife, demand payment in his name for losses of his
wife's paraphernalia covered by the policy, and subrogate the insurer
to his wife's rights against the parties responsible for the losses. The
decision is correct, but the opinion relies entirely on the law and
jurisprudence before 1944 and does not mention the effect of article
2386 as amended in 1944.
In Louisiana both under the Spanish laws'2 in force at the time
of the enactment of the Digest of 180811 and at all times thereafter,
the wife has had the right to administer her paraphernal assets with-
out the assistance of her husband. 4 The husband, nevertheless, has
9. La. Acts 1970, No. 344.
10. 291 So. 2d 857 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
11. 294 So. 2d 623 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
12. Pugh, The Spanish Community of Gains in 1803: Sociedad de Gananciales,
30 LA. L. REv. 1, at 14, 15 & n.102 (1969).
13. A Digest of the Civil Laws Now in Force in the Territory of Orleans (La. Digest
of 1808).
14. LA. Crw. CODE art. 2384 and corresponding articles of previous civil codes.
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been entitled to administer the wife's paraphernalia as long as the
wife does not demand its exclusive administration. 5 If both the wife
and husband administer the paraphernalia, it is to be considered
administered by the husband." Until 1944 the wife could claim her
exclusive right simply by opposing her husband's administration in
fact, no matter what the matrimonial regime of the spouses. This rule
survives today for the wife whose matrimonial regime excludes the
community of gains. Under the 1944 amendment to article 2386 of the
Civil Code, however, the wife may not claim the exclusive right to
administer her paraphernalia unless she files an authentic
declaration to this effect in the parish in which the spouses are domi-
ciled. 7 If this construction of the 1944 amendment is correct, then the
husband and wife are entitled each to the non-exclusive administra-
tion of the wife's paraphernalia until she records the proper declara-
tion.
DISSOLUTION OF COMMUNITY BY JUDGMENT OF SEPARATION OR DIVORCE
Article 155 of the Louisiana Civil Code currently provides that a
judgment of separation [or of divorce] retroactively dissolves the
matrimonial regime of the spouses as of the date on which the suit
was filed. Hodson v. Hodson" construed this to mean that the com-
munity of gains of the spouses was dissolved as of the date of the filing
of the defendant's reconventional demand, on which the separation
was granted, rather than on the date on which the plaintiff filed suit.
The decision is logical, but the contrary conclusion would have been
sustainable under the language of article 155 and would have had the
advantage of ending the community of gains somewhat sooner after
the spouses' cessation of the common life. Indeed, the amendment of
article 155 to terminate the community of gains-as between the
spouses, but not as to third persons-as of the time their common life
ceased would improve our law. There is no basis for a community of
15. Id. arts. 2387, 2388 and corresponding articles of previous civil codes.
16. Id. art. 2385 and corresponding articles of previous civil codes.
17. Id. art. 2386, para. 1, as amended by La. Acts 1944, No. 286: "The fruits of
the paraphernal property of the wife, wherever the property be located and however
administered, whether natural, civil, including interest, dividends and rents, or from
the result of labor, fall into the conjugal partnership, if there exists a community of
acquets and gains; unless the wife, by written instrument, shall declare that she re-
serves all of such fruits for her own separate use and benefit and her intention to
administer such property separately and alone. The said instrument shall be executed
before a Notary Public and two witnesses and duly recorded in the Conveyance Re-
cords of the Parish where the community is domiciled."
18. 292 So. 2d 831 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974).
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gains during a period of separation in fact followed by a suit for and
judgment of separation or divorce.
SUITS PENDING SEPARATION OR DIVORCE
Guarino v. Guarino19 may evidence a serious misconception of
the effect of the rule of article 155 of the Civil Code on the husband's
capacity, pending suit for separation or divorce, to [sue or] be sued
and to stand in judgment on a community [right or] obligation. The
facts were that, while a separation suit was pending, the husband
failed to take exception to a suit filed against him on notes - pre-
sumably signed during marriage - and allowed a default judgment
to be rendered against him.2" The wife sought to have the judgment
declared null and, if the writer reads the opinion correctly, both the
trial and appellate courts agreed with her on the basis that the judg-
ment of separation operated retroactively to the day the separation
suit had been filed and that this retroactivity deprived the husband
of the capacity to be sued and stand in judgment as to a community
affair."
This decision is not correct. Article 155 must be understood to
mean no more than that, as between the spouses, that is to say, for
accounting between them, the judgment of separation dissolves the
community of gains retroactively to the day on which the separation
suit was filed. It cannot mean more without conflicting with articles
149 and 150 which, in forbidding only certain acts to the husband,
imply the continuation of the remainder of his authority as adminis-
trator of the community of gains (under article 2404) until the rendi-
tion of the judgment of separation. Neither article 149 nor article 150
deprives the husband of the capacity to sue and stand in judgment
with regard to community rights and obligations. Article 150 merely
declares it "unlawful" for the husband to "contract any debt on
account of the community" or to alienate community immovables
during this time; and even an alienation of a community immovable
by the husband in this period is valid if it is not made "with the
19. 282 So. 2d 584 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
20. The fact that the suit was filed by the husband's mother long after the obliga-
tions had prescribed and that the husband failed to plead prescription may suggest
that the purpose of the suit was to deprive the wife of a portion of her interest in the
community of gains. The decision, however, appears not to have taken this into consid-
eration, and should not have, for an obligor is not obliged to plead prescription.
21. The writer finds the opinion and decree confusing, for the opinion supports
the lower court's decision that the default judgment might be attacked and yet the
decree reads as if that decision was being set aside. The writer believes, therefore, that
the court of appeal intended to set aside the default judgment in the suit against the
husband.
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fraudulent view of injuring the rights of the wife." Article 149 gives
the wife the right to demand an injunction forbidding the husband
to dispose of community assets of every kind, but unless the injunc-
tion issues the husband preserves those rights not denied him in
article 150, and the capacity to sue or be sued on community rights
and obligations is not denied him under that article.
PENSION PLANS AND OTHER EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
Two interesting decisions on employee benefits were rendered by
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal. They demonstrate forcibly that
there is need to study and legislate on the manner in which interests
in such fringe benefits should be regulated under the regime of the
community of gains.
In Lynch v. Lawrence2 the husband had been employed by the
same company before and during marriage under the community of
gains, had acquired during marriage the eventual right to receive
payments under a pension plan financed totally by the employer, but
was not entitled to receive such payments until both retirement and
attaining age sixty-five. Reasoning correctly that the eventual pay-
ments should be regarded as compensation for services rendered by
the husband, the court decided the wife should share in these pay-
ments, when actually made to the husband in the future, according
to a formula which might reflect her just interest therein deriving
from the fact that the husband's earnings enter the community of
gains as long as it lasts. The court very wisely refrained from consid-
ering the husband obligated as of the moment of the dissolution of
the community to pay the wife one half the estimated value of his
interest in the pension plan.
The formula determined upon by the court to compute the wife's
share of the future pension payments, however, did not do full justice
to the husband. The wife was declared entitled to receive a share in
each such payment corresponding to the ratio of (1) one-half of the
discounted value of the husband's interest in the pension plan as of
the termination of the community of gains to (2) the discounted value
of his interest in the pension plan as of his retirement and attaining
age sixty-five. Two defects may be discovered in the formula. The
first is that the court failed to take into consideration that the hus-
band's interest as of the dissolution of the community of gains re-
flected years of employment before his marriage. The second is that
the court failed to provide for the possibility that the husband might
remarry before retirement and thus that some of his retirement pay-
22. 293 So. 2d 598 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
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ments would reflect earnings during the second marriage. The for-
mula reached by the court, nevertheless, is good in principle; it needs
only refinement in application.
The other decision, that in Succession of Mendoza,3 is less un-
derstandable. Again the court was dealing with a benefit plan fi-
nanced by the employer alone, and again the husband had been
employed before as well as after marriage. Here, however, the benefit
was not one of pension payments, but of a lump sum payable on the
employee's death to a "beneficiary" named by him or to his succes-
sion. The court decided the death benefit was similar to insurance
and should be treated in the same way. Accordingly, the court rea-
soned, the employee having become entitled before marriage to have
the death benefit paid to his beneficiary or to his succession on his
death, the death benefit should be regarded as his separate property,
he not having named a beneficiary. Judge Lemmon concurred with
the result, (mistakenly) considering the court "barred by the author-
ity of [previous] decisions," but argued that the death benefit
should not have been considered a part of his succession assets, but
only a right of his heirs, the husband never having had a right to
collect the proceeds during his lifetime.
It seems safe to say that both the majority of the court and Judge
Lemmon were in error. Judge Lemmon's position that the death ben-
efit, though controllable by the deceased, cannot be considered an
element of his patrimony, ignores the fact that a right to control
economic value is a thing, an element of patrimony. Insurance pro-
ceeds payable to a beneficiary other than the insured are not counted
as part of the insured's patrimony under Louisiana law only because
of Louisiana's decision not to subject such proceeds to the claims of
the deceased's heirs and creditors. Certainly such proceeds form a
part of one's succession so far as United States tax law is concerned,
and justly so. The majority opinion is found wanting in that the
amount of the death benefit payable here depended on days of em-
ployment after marriage as well as before marriage, and thus the
death benefit truly reflected compensation for services after marriage
as well as before, or compensation while the community of gains was
in existence as well as before. Life insurance proceeds, on the other
hand, usually are fixed in amount from the time the policy is taken
out. In any event, employee benefits are earnings and any reasoning
which permits an employee to deprive his spouse of a half interest
therein must be considered in violation of the marriage contract of
the community of gains.
23. 288 So. 2d 673 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
